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1. Introduction 
The European Commission on European Governance’s White Paper of the, issued in July 2002, 
boosted the discussion on the reform of European governance.1 In this document, the Commission 
lists five principles that underpin good governance: openness, participation, accountability, 
effectiveness and coherence. These principles are believed to form the basis for democracy and the 
rule of law in the member states, but in fact apply to all levels of government – local, regional, national, 
European and global. 
Although ‘good governance’ has been on the agenda of many international organizations for fifty 
years – as a result of expectations regarding their increasing role in the structuring of international 
society – the notion originally had to do with the equal participation of states or stimulating national 
democracy rather than with bringing international organizations closer to the citizens.2 Nevertheless, 
some of the principles, which featured in that debate (democratic representation, accountability, 
transparency) are similar to the ones which we now encounter in the discussion on the European 
Union and public administration. 
As said, the Commission’s White Paper serves as a reference framework for the current debate. 
While the European Community seems to be the main focus of the White Paper, the numerous 
references to the European Union allow for the application of the various ideas and plans to the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the newly established European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) as well.3 In fact, the above quotation from the White Paper reveals the steps 
foreseen by the Commission: an internal application of the principles of good governance, followed by 
the promotion of these principles on a global level. 
The present contribution aims to follow the same path. First of all the concept of good 
governance will be applied to the CFSP arrangements as laid down in the Treaty on European Union. 
The concept itself will not be challenged; I will simply depart from the principles that are thought to 
underpin good governance in the White Paper as well as in surrounding literature. Secondly, at the 
end this chapter attempts to consider good governance as a substantive element of EU policy vis-à-vis 
third states. To what extent has the Union indeed been given competences to make ‘a contribution to 
global governance’ as heralded by the White Paper. 
                                                 
 
1 COM(2001) 428 final, Brussels, 27 July 2001. 
2 See N. Woods, ‘Good Governance in International Organizations’, Global Governance, 1999, p. 39-61; Th. 
M. Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’, American Journal of International Law, 1992, 
p. 46-91. 
3 The arrangements concerning these policies are not laid down in the EC Treaty, but in Title V of the Treaty 
on European Union. Parts of the present paper are based on R.A. Wessel, The European Union’s Foreign 
and Security Policy: A Legal Institutional Perspective, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1999. 
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Lawyers are not yet fully accustomed – and maybe not even fully qualified – to play a part in the 
governance debate. They lean heavily on insights offered by scholars in sociology, political science 
and public administration. In fact, as one observer held, the ‘governance project’ of the Commission 
could be viewed as “a package of innovation launched strategically into a legally undefined space that 
is located somewhere between administrative and constitutional reform”.4 At the same time a 
distinctive role for legal science in this debate must imply an original point of view, in which the 
principles underlying good governance are translated into more ‘down to earth’ legal terms. This has, 
for instance, been done with regard to the principle of coherence, which received abundant attention in 
the post-Maastricht literature.5 In the present article an attempt is made to find out to what extent the 
Union lives up to some of the other principles mentioned by the Commission by highlighting the 
competences of the Union and the legal arrangements governing the democratic and judicial 
accountability and transparency of decision-making in the area of CFSP. This focus on legal rules and 
competences obviously does not reveal the practice of the involvement of civil society in CFSP (if it’s 
at all present). Neither does it supply answers as to the effectiveness of the existing arrangements in 
terms of actual (political) influence on CFSP, or to the functioning of CFSP in terms of legitimacy. On 
the other hand, it does reveal the legal framework which sets the boundaries – and at the same time 
offers the opportunities – for applying the principles of good governance in this area. 
Section two will focus on the parliamentary control of CFSP, both by the European Parliament 
and by the national parliaments. The reason for this is that the Treaty lays down a system in which 
citizen involvement is embedded in a system of democratic representation on two ‘constitutional’ 
levels.6 More direct possibilities for civil society, however, depend on their knowledge of what is going 
on in CFSP. Section 3 will investigate the legal arrangements concerning the transparency of decision-
making and access to information. This will be followed by a survey of the possibilities for judicial 
scrutiny of the CFSP decisions and procedures, at the European level, but also at the national and 
international levels (section 4). Finally, section 5 will look into good governance as a substantive 
foreign policy objective and the possibilities of the Union to contribute to ‘global governance’. 
 
2. Parliamentary Control of CFSP Decision-Making 
2.2 The Competences of the European Parliament 
2.2.1 The Emergence of Parliamentary Scrutiny at the European Level 
In discussing the competences of the European Parliament (EP), one enters one of the most criticized 
areas of European integration. Many regard the ‘democratic deficit’ as one of the principal 
shortcomings of the European Union.7 Regarding cooperation also in the area of foreign policy, the 
influence of the EP on decision-making as well as its supervision has traditionally been marginal. 
Whereas the proposal for a European Political Union drafted by the French Government in 1960 
                                                 
4  Chr. Joerges, ‘Guest Editorial: The Commission’s White Paper on Governance in the EU – A Symptom of 
Crisis?’, Common Market Law Review, 2002, p. 441-445. 
5 See for references R.A. Wessel, ‘The Inside Looking Out: Consistency and Delimitation in EU External 
Relations’, Common Market Law Review, 2000, p. 1135-1171. 
6 See for the constitutional approach of European foreign policy in these terms my article entitled ‘The Multi-
Level Constitution of European Foreign Relations’, in D. Curtin et al., The Emerging Constitution of the 
European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004 (forthcoming). 
7 An extensive analysis as well as a survey of views is provided in D.M Curtin, ‘Betwixt and Between: 
Democracy and Transparency in the Governance of the European Union’, in J. Winter, et. al. (eds.), 
Reforming the Treaty on European Union – The Legal Debate, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1996, 
p. 95-121; or D.M Curtin, Postnational Democracy: The European Union in Search of a Political Philosophy, 
The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1997. See also E.-U. Petersmann, ‘The Moral Foundations of the 
European Union’s Foreign Policy Constitution: Defining ‘European Identity’ and ‘Community Interests’ for the 
Benefit of EU Citizens’, Aussenwirtschaft, issue II, 1996, p. 151-176 and M. Hilf and F. Schorkopf, ‘Das 
Europäische Parlement in den Außenbeziehungen der Europäischen Union’, Europarecht, issue 2, 1999, p. 
185-202. 
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already envisaged a democratically elected body to exert control over a European foreign policy,8 the 
EP has found itself fighting for its ‘rights’ ever since the creation of European Political Cooperation 
(EPC) at the beginning of the 1970s.9 The 1970 Davigon Report provided for a yearly ‘progress report’ 
to the EP by the Presidency (‘the president-in-office of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs’) and for ‘six-
monthly meetings’ between the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and the EP’s Political Affairs Committee. 
The 1973 Copenhagen Report doubled the frequency of these meetings as the yearly meetings of the 
foreign ministers increased from two to four. In fact, these provisions triggered an increase in the 
interest of the EP in questions of foreign policy, which had been very limited before 1973.10 On the 
other hand, possibilities for the EP to develop a policy were limited as well, as the EPC provisions did 
not confer any powers on the EP to influence or control European foreign policy. In the EP’s opinion, 
the foreign ministers’ meetings should be ‘immediately followed by a colloquy between the ministers 
and the Political Affairs Committee’,11 but practice showed that the Committee’s meetings were, at 
best, attended by the Presidency only. 
An annual debate between the EP and the Presidency on the basis of the ‘progress report’ was 
introduced in 1974, but did not increase the possibilities for control, since here too the EP depended 
on the information provided by the Presidency and was bound to deliver ex post facto opinions only. 
The same holds true for the competence of the EP, introduced in the same year, to address ‘questions 
on political cooperation’ to the Presidency. Regardless of this competence, until May 1976 the 
ministers refused to recognize that such questions could be addressed during question time. The 
ordinary procedure often involved considerable delays, which significantly reduced the value of posing 
questions.12 In 1978 the EP expressed: 
‘its concern at the lack of substantive and up-to-date information given to the European Parliament by 
the foreign ministers of the Nine concerning measures of joint foreign policy’.13 
With the further codification of the European Political Cooperation in the Single European Act in 1986, 
the position of the EP did not improve, as its influence was still described as vaguely as possible: 
‘The High Contracting Parties shall ensure that the European Parliament is closely associated with 
European Political Cooperation. To that end the Presidency shall regularly inform the European 
Parliament of the foreign policy issues which are being examined within the framework of Political 
Cooperation and shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into 
consideration’.14 
It proved that terms like ‘closely associated’, ‘regularly inform’, and ‘taken into consideration’ provided 
enough possibilities for the ministers to limit parliamentary control to a partial right to information.15 In 
general, parliamentary control over foreign policy is limited on a national level as well,16 and ministers 
were reluctant to introduce powers in the 1986 Treaty that would constrain their traditional freedom to 
                                                 
8 See for the text of this proposal for instance J.C. Masclet, L’Union politique de l’Europe, Paris, Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1973, p. 45. 
9 See in particular: G. Gaja, ‘European Parliament and Foreign Affairs: (1) Political Cooperation among the 
Nine’, in A. Cassese (ed.), Parliamentary Control over Foreign Policy: Legal Essays, Alphen aan den Rijn, 
Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980, p. 191-205. 
10 Ibidem, p. 193. 
11 See Resolution of 6 April 1973, OJ C 26, 1973, p. 26. 
12 See G. Gaja, supra note 9, p. 195. 
13 Resolution of 19 January 1978, OJ C 36, 1978, p. 33. 
14 Article 30, para. 4 SEA. 
15 Cf. S. Stavridis, ‘The Democratic Control of CFSP’, in M. Holland (ed.), Common Foreign and Security 
Policy: the Record and Reforms, London, Pinter, 1997, p. 136-147, at p. 137. 
16 See A. Cassese, supra note 8. Cf. also Th. Grunert, ‘The Association of the European Parliament: No 
Longer the Underdog in EPC?’, in E. Regelsberger et al. (eds.), Foreign Policy of the European Union: From 
EPC to CFSP and Beyond, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1997, p. 109-132, at p. 112: ‘In the individual states, 
foreign and security policy is traditionally the exclusive competence of governments. Parliaments can 
monitor government action through questions, motions of non confidence, the adoption or rejection of 
international treaties, and by means of ratification procedures’. 
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act according to specific circumstances in European affairs. The Treaty on European Union still 
reflects this idea and the competences of the EP that have developed since 1970 have found their 
way into the current article 21. 
 
2.2.2 Current Competences of the European Parliament in CFSP 
Article 21 TEU reads: 
‘The Presidency shall consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of 
the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament 
are duly taken into consideration. The European Parliament shall be kept regularly informed by the 
Presidency and the Commission of the development of the Union’s foreign and security policy. 
The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it. It shall 
hold an annual debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy’.17 
The imperative nature of the norms laid down in this provision makes it clear that the Presidency is 
obliged to consult the EP and take its views into consideration. Furthermore, the EP’s right to be kept 
informed results in obligations for the Presidency and the Commission. Therefore, the problem – if one 
wants – lies not so much in the choice of norms, but in the contents of the obligation laid down in 
these norms. The terms ‘main aspects’ and ‘basic choices’ were not defined by the Treaty, which 
seems to leave their interpretation to the discretion of the Presidency. The same holds true for ‘takes 
into consideration’ and ‘regularly’. 
Moreover, it is striking that the two main decision-making organs – the Council of Ministers and 
the European Council – are not accountable to the EP. The relationship of the EP with the Council is 
limited to its power to ask questions and to make recommendations.18 The latter possibility has only 
been used modestly.19 No direct link exists between the EP and the European Council, despite the 
fact that the latter institution is responsible for the definition of the principles of and general guidelines 
for the common foreign and security policy and for Common Strategies (Article 13, paragraphs 1 and 
2). It has been observed that the European Council has a de facto right of initiative which is not open 
to censure. Thus, Parliament’s active participation in shaping the substance of CFSP rests with the 
entire discretion of the member states.20 Parliament itself pointed to a need to have a mandatory right 
to be consulted on the formulation of general guidelines and Common Strategies.21 
The Presidency was given the task of consulting the EP and of ensuring that its views are taken 
into consideration.22 In practice, however, the consultation procedure has proved to be inadequate. In 
                                                 
17 Regarding PJCC, a similar regime may be found in article 39, paras. 2 and 3. However, on the basis of 
paragraph 1, the Council shall consult the EP before adopting any PJCC decision other than a Common 
Position. 
18 Parliament’s right to make recommendations on CFSP issues is confirmed in its Rules of Procedure of 
February 2003, Rule 104. In urgent cases, the power to issue recommendations on foreign policy is 
transferred to the Presidency. 
19 Recommendations of the EP concerned regions in crisis failing a strong policy by the Council (for instance 
Chechnya in 1995 and Kosovo in 1996). See EP Document PE 216.369/def of 30 May 1996 (Fernández-
Albor Report) and Document 220.788/def of 28 May 1997 (Spencer Report). 
20 A. Maurer, ‘Democratic Governance in the European Union: The Institutional Terrain after Amsterdam’, in J. 
Monar and W. Wessels (eds.), The European Union after the Treaty of Amsterdam, London/New York, 
Continuum, 2001, p. 96-124, at p. 116. 
21 Opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy for the Committee on Institutional 
Affairs on the Operation of the Treaty on European Union with a View to the Intergovernmental Conference 
in 1996 (PE 211.022/fin), 21 February 1995; and Committee on Institutional Affairs, Working Document on 
the CFSP Process (PE 211.310), 1995. 
22 Rule 103 of the EP’s Rules of Procedure of February 2003 affirms the right to be consulted and informed on 
CFSP matters. The Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security, and Defence Policy is responsible for ensuring 
that Parliament is consulted in this area and that its opinions are taken into account. This task is carried out 
when Council and Commission representatives appear at the meetings of the Committee; via oral questions 
in plenary meetings and via the Committee’s dialogue with the High Representative. 
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October 1993, just prior to the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, the Council drew up a 
number of guidelines to establish close relations with the EP in the area of CFSP;23 nevertheless 
practice has not revealed any real possibilities for supervision by the EP. It is true that the EP is 
informed by the Council and the Commission concerning the main developments in CFSP, but the 
information often arrives too late for Parliament to share its views with the Council. The annual debate 
on the developments in foreign policy is by its very nature bound to be limited to an exchange of 
statements on and control over the activities of the European Council on the basis of the reports 
produced by this institution – after each meeting and yearly on the progress achieved by the Union 
(Article 4 TEU) – and can only take place ex post facto.24 In its 1995 Report on the implementation of 
CFSP, the EP complained that it had never been consulted on the main aspects and the basic choices 
of the CFSP, let alone being consulted on concrete proposals for joint actions.25 In the beginning the 
EP did not even receive copies of the Declarations adopted by the Council.26 In 1999 Parliament again 
noted that: 
‘while the treaty obligations of Article 21 to keep Parliament fully informed on the development of the 
Union’s foreign and security policy have been fulfilled more or less satisfactorily by the Commission, 
the same cannot be said about the Council and the Presidency which did not make any recognisable 
effort to build up a fruitful relationship with Parliament on a continuous basis’.27 
The introduction of the High Representative on CFSP during the same year resulted in some 
improvement. The HR is invited to make statements in Parliament and practice reveals a constructive 
willingness on the part of the HR to respond to these invitations and to have discussions with the 
MEPs on foreign policy issues.28 
Irrespective of its marginal role in CFSP issues, the Commission’s activities are of interest to the 
MEPs as well. Controlling the Commission may formally take place by making use of existing 
Community procedures. In this respect, it should be noted that regarding the necessary approval by 
the EP of the five-year appointment of the Commission (Article 214 EC), the EP may also take into 
account the position and functioning of the Commission in the area of CFSP. Likewise, the EP may 
make use of its right to request the Commission to submit proposals on certain CFSP positions or 
actions (Article 192 EC) and the Commission is obliged to reply to questions put to it by the EP or by 
its members (Article 197 EC).29 Some authors have even hinted at the possibility that the EP may 
adopt a motion of censure, since article 201 EC does not explicitly restrict the use of this instrument to 
                                                 
23 The guidelines were adopted in the Council Decision of 26 October 1993. These guidelines were further 
elaborated by COREPER in July 1994; see Doc. SN 3258/94, partie A, Relations entre le Parlement 
européen et le Conseil, adopted by COREPER, 8 July 1994. 
24 The rule that the European Council shall submit to Parliament a report after each of its meetings and an 
annual written report on the progress achieved by the Union amounts to a consolidation of established EPC 
practice. See also point 2.1.4 of the Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart, 19 June 1983, Bull. EC 6/1983. 
25 Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy (Rapporteur Matutes), 20 April 
1995 (A4-0083/95), p. 17. Cf. also Th. Grunert, supra note 16, p. 113, who asserted that Parliament has 
never been consulted beforehand and regularly on foreign policy decisions. 
26 See the analysis of the former President of the EP and of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security, E. 
Barón Crespo, ‘CFSP: The View of the European Parliament’, in S.A. Pappas and S. Vanhoonacker (eds.), 
The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Challenges of the Future, Maastricht, 
EIPA, 1996, p. 37-44 at p. 38. However, the above-mentioned COREPER decision of July 1994 explicitly 
provides: ‘les déclarations que la Présidence ou le Conseil adoptent seront transmisses sans délai au 
Parlement par tous moyens appropriés’. According to the same decision, other Council decisions are 
transmitted to the EP ‘dans les meilleurs délais’; whereas responses to written questions are transmitted 
‘dans un délai raisonnable’. 
27 Resolution on the role of the Union in the world: Implementation of the common foreign and security policy 
for 1998, No. A4-0242/1999. 
28 See also Rule 101 of the Rules of Procedure of the EP of February 2003. 
29 Cf. T. Heukels and J. de Zwaan, ‘The Configuration of the European Union: Community Dimensions of 
Institutional Interaction’, in D.M. Curtin and T. Heukels (eds.), Institutional Dynamics of European 
Integration, Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers, vol. II, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, 
p. 195-228, at p. 218. 
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the Community policies of the Commission.30 However, unlike the other articles mentioned, article 201 
EC is not referred to in article 28 TEU, which a contrario would exclude this possibility. But, more 
importantly, apart from the fact that these instruments are both very indirect and in most cases not 
proportional, the limited influence of the Commission on CFSP decision-making has a direct effect on 
the Parliament’s possibilities of controlling this policy through the Commission. 
However, the EU’s foreign policy is primarily, but not at all exclusively, to be dealt with under the 
CFSP provisions. A number of policy areas are included in the EC Treaty, allowing the EP to make 
use of the Community procedures in its supervision as well – as is the case with the Commission. First 
of all, Parliament can decide on general foreign policy guidelines for development cooperation, to 
which the co-decision procedure applies (Article 179, paragraph 1 EC). Secondly, the assent of the EP 
is required for association agreements with third countries and international organizations on the basis 
of article 300 EC (and for the accession of new member states on the basis of art. 49 TEU). Finally, 
the EP has a direct influence once CFSP expenditure is charged to the budget of the European 
Communities (infra). On the other hand, the provision on sanctions, article 301 EC, allows for the 
Council to decide to interrupt in part or completely economic relations with a third country without 
having to consult the EP. 
It is clear that the formal competences of the EP with regard to the supervision of CFSP are 
limited. Parliament itself is of course very well aware of this situation and has constantly pressed for 
more powers in this regard.31 It may be true that the launching of CFSP was one of the reasons for the 
EP’s approval of the Treaty on European Union,32 but Parliament only accepted the outcome as it 
regards the current situation as a transition phase, ‘eventually leading to a comprehensive 
democratization of the process of planning and implementing CFSP’.33 Overall, as one observer put it: 
‘the current situation confirms the old prejudice surrounding governments’ exclusive role in foreign 
policy, to be exercised in total secrecy and away from the ‘intrusions’ of representative organs and the 
public eye. EU ministers exercise their foreign policy-making independently from the European 
Parliament, especially in the field of CFSP which is still a broad framework rather than an inclusive 
system’.34 
However, in the meantime, the EP found some ways to supervise CFSP regardless of its limited 
Treaty competences. This is above all reflected in the regular dialogue with the Council, which is used 
by Parliament to question the passivity of CFSP in relation to certain issues (like for instance the 
                                                 
30 This option seems to be included by T. Heukels and J. de Zwaan, supra note 29, when they refer to (ex) 
article 144 in relation to (ex) article 138b EC, at p. 218, footnote 107. A similar hint is made by N. Neuwahl, 
‘Foreign and Security Policy and the Implementation of the Requirement of “Consistency” under the Treaty 
on European Union’, in D. O’Keeffe and P. Twomey (eds.), Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty, London, 
Wiley Chancery Law, 1994, p. 227-246 at p. 243. 
31 See in particular Resolution A3-0189/92, adopted on 20 January 1993, OJ C 42, 15.2.93, at 129 (the 
Hänsch Report); Resolution A3-0322/92, adopted on 18 December 1992, OJ C 21, 25.1.93, at 503 (the 
Verde Report); Resolution on the European Council Report Towards European Union, adopted on 11 March 
1993, OJ C 115, 26 April 1993, at 175; Resolution A3-0041/94, adopted on 24 February 1994 (the De Gucht 
Report); Resolution A4-0083/95 of 20 April 1995 (the Matutes Report); and Resolution A4-0102/95, of 4 May 
1995, adopted on 17 May 1995 (the Bourlanges/Martin Report). 
 See on the contributions of the EP to the 1990/91 IGC also S. Vanhoonacker, ‘The European Parliament’, in 
F. Laursen and S. Vanhoonacker, The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union: Institutional 
Reforms, New Policies and International Identity of the European Community, Maastricht, EIPA, 1992, p. 
215-228. In fact, the EP had wanted to approve the ‘important interests in common’ that would be defined by 
the European Council. See the Resolution of 10 October 1991 on the IGC on Political Union, OJ 1991 C 
280, p. 148. 
32 See E. Barón Crespo, supra note 26, p. 38. 
33 See the Resolution of the European Parliament of 18 December 1992, Doc. A3-0322/92. A ‘comprehensive 
democratization’ would, however, also call for a different attitude of the EP’s standing committees. 
Parliament’s internal procedures for scrutinising CFSP are often affected by rivalries between these 
committees. Thus, the REX Committee and the Budgets Committee both tend to interfere occasionally with 
matters which the Foreign Affairs Committee considers to be of its own domain. 
34 D.M. Viola, European Foreign Policy and the European Parliament in the 1990s: An Investigation into the 
Role and Voting Behaviour of the European Parliament’s Political Groups, Aldershot, etc., Ashgate, 2000, p. 
43. 
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Russian military actions by Chechnya or democratization in the Mediterranean). The EP’s Annual 
Reports usually strongly criticize the (absence of) actions by the Council under CFSP, beside 
suggesting alternative approaches, and in some cases Parliamentary pressure has indeed led to a 
modification of Joint Actions (for instance concerning Mostar).35 In addition, the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Human Rights, and Common Security and Defence Policy as well as the President of 
Parliament frequently meet with Foreign Ministers and Presidents of third states, allowing the EP to 
contribute to the foreign policy debate.36 This more positive dimension formed a reason for Bieber to 
conclude: 
‘The European Parliament’s activities in the sphere of general international politics provides the most 
striking example of a parliament’s modern role in this field. Without any powers to compel the member 
states’ governments – let aside powers to impose its views on third countries – the European 
Parliament has developed a strong international consciousness. The responsibility of European 
people in world affairs and the need to voice diverging views on common values found a unique forum 
in the European Parliament. No national parliament so frequently debates events of other parts of the 
world, denounces violations of human rights, peace and freedom. Correspondingly statesmen from all 
over the world seek the opportunity to address via the European deputies, the European peoples’.37 
Moreover, and most effectively, Parliament found a way to use its budgetary competences to 
supervise at least part of the CFSP actions of the Council. 
 
2.2.3 Budgetary Influence of the EP on CFSP: The ‘Power of the Purse’ 
At first sight, the provision in the 1992 article J.11 that administrative CFSP expenditure was to be 
charged to the EC budget, and that the Council could also decide to charge operational expenditure to 
that budget, did not give rise to increased possibilities for supervision by the European Parliament. 
Nevertheless, the provision that in that event ‘the budgetary procedure laid down in the Treaty 
establishing the European Community shall be applicable’ should have warned the drafters of the 
TEU. Over the years the EP has made full use of this provision to influence and supervise CFSP 
developments.38 
In the EPC period the administrative expenditure for organizing meetings and distributing 
documents fell under the responsibility of the Presidency. Each foreign ministry paid the travel costs of 
its representatives, and the small EPC Secretariat costs were kept to a minimum thanks to effective 
arrangements with the General Secretariat of the EC Council.39 In the 1990/91 IGC it was clear from 
the outset that the more ambitious CFSP would need new financial arrangements, but a consensus on 
a new procedure was difficult to reach. Here as well the diverging views came out of a preference for 
either a more ‘communitarized’ or a strictly intergovernmental CFSP. The compromise in article J.11, 
                                                 
35 See for instance the Reports of 20 April 1994, 30 May 1996 and 28 May 1997. Cf. also S. Keukeleire, Het 
buitenlands beleid van de Europese Unie, Deventer, Kluwer, 1998, p. 271 and p. 314. 
36 See the Parliament’s assessment of its own role in the Report on the Role of the Union in the World: 
Implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy for 1997 (Spencer Report), 30 April 1998, A4-
1069/98, p. 12. 
37 R. Bieber, ‘Democratic Control of International Relations of the European Union’, in E. Cannizzaro (e.), The 
European Union as an Actor in International Relations, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p. 105-
116 at p. 110. 
38 See in particular the studies by J. Monar, ‘The Financial Dimension of the CFSP’, in M. Holland (ed.), 
Common Foreign and Security Policy: the Record and Reforms, London, Pinter, 1997, p. 34-51 and The 
Finances of the Union’s Intergovernmental Pillars: Tortuous Experiments with the Community Budget, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, No. 1, p. 57-78. See also B.-C. Ryba, ‘La politique étrangère et de 
sécurité commune (PESC): Mode d’emploi et bilan d’une année d’application (fin 1993/1994)’, Revue du 
marché commun et de l’Union européenne, No. 384, 1995, p. 14-35, that were very helpful in drafting this 
section. According to Ryba (p. 20) the negotiators had not foreseen the extensive influence of the EP 
through the budgetary regulations. 
39 J. Monar, supra note 38, p. 34. 
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paragraph 2, reflected both views as it allowed for administrative expenditure to be charged to the EC 
budget and for operational expenditure to either be charged to that budget (after a unanimous decision 
to that end) or to the national budgets of the member states (in accordance with a scale to be 
decided). 
The very first Joint Action of 8 November 1993 (one week after the entry into force of the TEU) 
already highlighted the need for member states to make use of the EC budget. It proved to be 
extremely difficult to finance the support for the convoying of humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina 
out of the national budgets. The procedure was far from efficient, and it was a reason for the Council in 
some cases to refer to the administrative costs only when operational expenditure was obviously also 
involved.40 The reason was that complex national budgetary mechanisms or the hesitance of some 
member states to fulfil their financial obligations would at least not be able to prevent the joint action 
from taking place. 
However, sparing national budgets in this way resulted in an increase in the influence of the 
European Parliament. The first action of the EP in this respect took place on 28 October 1993, when it 
amended the draft budget by inserting one million ECU into the Commission’s operational reserves for 
possible transfer to the operational costs of only.41 This move by the EP was meant to secure its 
influence on CFSP expenditure, since transfers between non-compulsory expenditure chapters 
proposed by the Commission can be approved or rejected by Parliament after consultation with the 
Council.42 Thus, any transfer of these finances to the regular CFSP chapter would need the approval 
of the EP. As we have seen, however, the Council continuously tried to limit the influence of the EP, 
either by using national budgets or by broad interpretations of ‘administrative costs’. This practice and 
the Council’s refusal to adopt an Interinstitutional Agreement led the EP to adopt a resolution on the 
guidelines for the 1995 budget, in which it insisted that the Council would have to state clearly how it 
was going to use funds for Joint Actions before Parliament would approve appropriations for this 
purpose.43 Council Decisions in 1995 indeed reflect an acceptance of EC funding, and thus of 
Parliamentary influence, but it remained clear that member states were still reluctant to accept more 
Parliamentary supervision over CFSP operations. However, since 1995 the situation has somewhat 
stabilized, and member states at least have to accept the budgetary influence of the EP on CFSP 
expenditure. In 1997 Parliament finally achieved an Interinstitutional Agreement on the financing of 
CFSP (replaced by the Agreement on budgetary discipline of 6 May 1999). 
These developments made it possible for the Amsterdam Treaty to do away the difference 
between administrative and operational expenditure in the TEU. Article 28 of the current Treaty 
stipulates that administrative as well as operational CFSP expenditure shall be charged to the budget 
of the European Communities. The only exceptions made concern operational expenditure arising 
from operations having military or defence implications (which in the view of certain member states do 
not allow for too much Community involvement) and cases where the Council unanimously decides 
that the operational expenditure is to be charged to the member states. 
 
2.3 The National Parliaments and CFSP 
The fact that CFSP decisions are taken by an institution of the Union – the Council of Ministers – does 
not contradict the fact that this institution is composed of ministers who are accountable for their 
international actions to their own parliaments as well. In fact, through the national political parties, the 
EP political groups can attempt to counterbalance the absence of their formal power in foreign 
                                                 
40 See for instance the Joint Action on the dispatch of a team of observers for the Parliamentary elections in 
the Russian Federation (93/604/CFSP of 9 November 1993) or the Joint Action on the inaugural conference 
on the Stability Pact (93/728/CFSP, 20 December 1993). 
41 OJ C 315, 22 November 1993, p. 459. Cf. also J. Monar, supra note 38, p. 40. 
42 See the Financial Regulation of 21 December 1997, article 21. OJ L 356, 31 December 1977,  
p. 9. 
43 Published in OJ C 25, April 1994, p. 33. 
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affairs.44 Nevertheless, the traditional prerogatives of the Executive in most member states in the field 
of foreign policy account for limited supervisory functions of the national parliaments.45 In none of the 
member states – except for Denmark46 – has CFSP decision-making been subjected to prior 
parliamentary approval, which restricts the influence of parliament to discussing both the agenda of 
forthcoming Council meetings and the outcome. Thus, the Dutch Parliament accepted that they 
discuss CFSP issues with the Government on the basis of ‘annotated Council agendas and Reports of 
Council meetings’.47 The cooperation between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Parliament’s 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs is indeed ‘as good as it can get’ on the basis of these 
procedures. It remains clear, however, that supervision by national parliaments is limited to one aspect 
only: the ex post facto control on the basis of decisions that were taken (or not taken) by the Council of 
Ministers. Hence, even the ultimate repercussion of a motion of no-confidence will not improve the 
supervisory possibilities of the national parliament, albeit that this control may have a preventive effect. 
Nevertheless, the national representatives at the Maastricht IGC adopted two declarations aiming 
at an increased involvement of national parliaments. Declaration No. 13 reads: 
‘The Conference considers that it is important to encourage greater involvement of national 
Parliaments in the activities of the European Union. 
To this end, the exchange of information between the national Parliaments and the European 
Parliament should be stepped up. In this context, the governments of the Member States will ensure, 
inter alia, that national Parliaments receive Commission proposals for legislation in good time for 
information or possible examination. 
Similarly, the Conference considers that it is important for contacts between the national Parliaments 
and the European Parliament to be stepped up, in particular through the granting of appropriate 
reciprocal facilities and regular meetings between members of Parliament interested in the same 
issues’. 
Furthermore, Declaration No. 14 adds that the European Parliament and the national parliaments may 
meet, as necessary, as a Conference of the Parliaments (or ‘Assises’) to be consulted on the main 
features of the European Union on the basis of reports by the Presidency and the Commission. 
The added value of these initiatives lies essentially in the increased possibilities for national 
parliaments to obtain information. It is doubtful, however, whether an increase in possibilities for 
supervision will result from the inter-parliamentary contacts. In the Netherlands, at least, this situation 
has resulted in an ongoing discussion on the need for parliamentary approval for decisions of 
international organizations, which by virtue of the Constitution (Article 94) prevail over national 
legislation whenever they have a generally binding character.48 Despite the recently developed 
instruments to make use of this possibility in relation to decisions within the framework of the (former) 
Schengen Agreement, PJCC, and Title III EC, no initiatives have been developed to extend this 
possibility to decision-making in the area of CFSP.49 
With regard to information to be provided to national parliaments, the Amsterdam IGC adopted a 
Protocol ‘on the role of national parliaments in the EU’. The Protocol focuses on improving the access 
of national parliaments to timely information, with a view to influencing their national governments 
                                                 
44 D.M. Viola, supra note 34, p. 44. 
45 See on this issue for instance L. Henkin, Constitutionalism, Democracy and Foreign Affairs, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1990; and L. Henkin , Parlement en buitenlands beleid, Publikaties van de 
Staatsrechtkring, No. 5, Zwolle, Tjeenk Willink, 1993. 
46 The Danish Minister can only vote in the Council on the basis of an explicit mandate given by the Danish 
Folketing.  
47 See the Documents of the Second Chamber, Goedkeuring Maastricht, Memorie van Antwoord, TK 1992-
1993, 22 647 (R 1437), No. 13, p. 147. 
48 See for instance: B.P. Vermeulen, ‘Slikken of stikken? De invloed van het parlement op het buitenlands 
beleid’, Staatscourant, 120, 29 June 1993. 
49 As for instance suggested by L. Besselink, ‘Tussen supranationaliteit en soevereiniteit: over het niet-
communautaire recht van de Europese Unie’, in L.F.M. Besselink et al. (eds.), Europese Unie en nationale 
soevereiniteit, Publicaties van de Staatsrechtkring, Deventer, Tjeenk Willink, 1997, p. 125-150 at p. 150. 
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under whatever national constitutional arrangements apply.50 In line with current practice, the Protocol 
calls for legislative proposals to be forwarded to national parliaments. The significance can be found in 
the fact that documents are henceforth no longer forwarded indirectly via national governments but 
directly to the national parliaments. Moreover, Commission proposals must be made available in good 
time (a minimum time-limit of six weeks), so that national parliaments can actually have the possibility 
of receiving them in time to discuss their content, before their government participates in the decision-
making procedure. However, CFSP decisions are almost never based on Commission proposals, but 
are prepared by the working groups and the Political Committee upon an initiative of the Presidency or 
any other member state. Therefore, in the current situation this improvement is of limited value and 
relates only to ‘foreign policy’ proposals of the Commission that find their basis in Community law. The 
conclusion that the Protocol excludes all CFSP documents seems to be justified.51 
A second innovation in the Amsterdam Protocol concerns the right of the Conference of 
European Affairs Committees (COSAC) to make any contribution it deems appropriate for the attention 
of the institutions of the European Union, in particular on draft legal texts which representatives of 
governments of the member states may decide by common accord to forward to it, in view of the 
nature of their subject matter. Again, however, the Protocol does not seem to have the intention of 
including CFSP, as COSAC may only examine ‘any legislative proposal or initiative in relation to the 
establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice’, ‘legislative activities of the Union, notably in 
relation to the application of the principle of subsidiarity’, and ‘questions regarding fundamental rights’. 
This has led one observer to conclude that ‘democratic control of action in this field is completely 
excluded’.52 
 
3. Transparency of Decision-Making and Access to Information 
3.1 Transparency of Decision-Making by the Council 
Effective supervision by the parliaments, or more directly by civil society, is hindered by the 
confidential and thus not too transparent nature of CFSP decision-making in the Council. As Curtin 
stated: ‘[t]he term ‘transparency’ evokes the image of a clear pane of glass through which light can 
shine in an unrestrained fashion’. She continued that: 
‘[t]ransparency refers not only to access to government-held information by individuals and legislative 
assemblies (both the European Parliament and the national parliaments), but also, more widely, to 
open government as such (the question of opening up meetings, rule-making proceedings and 
governmental deliberations to the public)’.53 
This idea does seem to be reflected in article 1 of the new TEU that ‘decisions are taken as openly as 
possible’. It seems that this new rule should be used in interpreting the Council’s Rules of Procedure, 
which in article 5 provide that: ‘Meetings of the Council shall not be public except in the cases referred 
to in article 8’.54 According to article 8, Council deliberations on acts to be adopted in accordance with 
the co-decision procedure are open to the public by way of transmission of the Council meeting by 
audiovisual means. In addition, the Council shall ‘as far as possible’ inform the public in advance of the 
dates and approximate time on which such audiovisual transmissions will take place. Paragraphs 2 
and 3 of article 8 furthermore provide that the General Affairs and External Relations Council holds a 
                                                 
50 Cf. D.M. Curtin, ‘The Fundamental Principle of Open Decision-Making and EU (Political) Citizenship’, in D. 
O’Keeffe and P. Twomey (eds.), Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty, Oxford, Hart Publishers, 1999, p. 
69-91. 
51 Cf. A. Maurer, supra note 20, p. 116. 
52 Ibidem, p. 117. 
53 D.M. Curtin, supra note 50, p. 66. 
54 Council Decision of 22 July 2002 adopting the Council’s Rules of Procedure (2002/682/EC, Euratom), PB L 
230, 28.8.2002. 
 12
public policy debate every year and that the Council shall hold at least one public debate on important 
new legislative proposals. All in all, the situation seems to be improving, at least where legislative 
decisions are concerned. It should be kept in mind, however, that CFSP decisions are regularly 
considered not to have a legislative nature. Moreover, it is obvious that CFSP decisions are never 
adopted through the co-decision procedure of article 251 EC. This means that the regime is only 
relevant in relation to the Community part of external policy decisions. In addition, the results of votes 
on CFSP decisions are made public only in case of a unanimous Council or COREPER decision taken 
at the request of one of its members.55 This provision reflects that, irrespective of article 1 of the EU 
Treaty, the transparency of decision-making is not the rule in CFSP. 
3.2 Access to Information on Foreign, Security and Defence Policy 
Apart from this procedural secrecy where decision-making is concerned, the access to documents and 
information from the very beginning of CFSP also depends on the Council’s willingness to submit 
information on the existence of documents. Article 18, paragraph 3, of the 1992 Rules of Procedure 
provided that the decision to publish the CFSP decisions in the Official Journal was in each case to be 
taken by the Council acting unanimously when the said instruments were adopted. This of course 
implied that any single member state can object to the publication of CFSP decisions and prevent it. 
Irrespective of the discussion on openness of information since then, this regime has not been 
modified. The 2002 Rules of Procedure still allow the Council and COREPER to decide unanimously, 
on a case by case basis, whether CFSP decisions should be published in the Official Journal (Article 
17, paras. 3 and 4). When they are not published, Common Strategies, Joint Actions and Common 
Positions are to be notified to their addressees (Article 18, para. 2). However, in this way many sui 
generis CFSP decisions as well as Resolutions run the risk of becoming invisible to the public. 
The Amsterdam Treaty modified the EC Treaty in which article 255, paragraph 1, now provides: 
‘Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a 
Member State, shall have a right of access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
documents, subject to the principles and the conditions to be defined in accordance with paragraph 2 
and 3’. 
Indeed paragraphs 2 and 3 reveal that there is still no unrestrained access to information, since limits 
on grounds of public or private interest are to be determined by the Council and the European 
Parliament (co-decision) within two years of the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty (paragraph 
2) and each institution shall elaborate in its own Rules of Procedure specific provisions regarding 
access to its documents (paragraph 3).56 Nevertheless, it is held that the fact that this obligation is now 
laid down in the text of the Treaty itself was a step forward with regard to the previous status quo, 
where the rather reluctant practice of several institutions was based upon an interinstitutional Code of 
Conduct, implemented separately by the three institutions in question.57 
For the purpose of the present contribution, however, it is striking that while article 1 TEU refers 
to decisions that are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen, the right of 
access to documents is only implemented in the EC Treaty and not in the Union Treaty. According to 
Curtin this seems to be an attempt to deny the fundamental status of the individual’s right to 
information.58 On the other hand, it seems clear that placing this right in the EC Treaty does not 
                                                 
55 Article 9, para 2 of the Council’s Rules of Procedure. 
56 The Council has done so in Annex II of its 2002 Rules of Procedure. 
57 D.M. Curtin, supra note 50, p. 68. A reason for Curtin to note this as an improvement is the ‘non-binding’ 
nature of the Code of Conduct. 
58 In Curtin’s interpretation the choice for article 255 EC does not limit the greatest possible level of openness 
aimed at by article 1 TEU. The fact that only three institutions are mentioned does not rule out that other 
institutions, agencies and organs with rule-making activities are subject to the general principles laid down in 
article 1 TEU. In addition, limiting the right of access to ‘documents’ does not exclude information contained 
in electronic form. Finally, the term ‘documents’ in article 255 is not to be interpreted as referring to 
‘documents originating from the institutions’, but rather to all incoming documents. In short, as a matter of 
general principle all the institutions and agencies and other EU bodies should be covered by the general 
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prevent its Union-wide application. Article 1 TEU, as the overarching general principle, explicitly refers 
to the new stage in the process of creating an ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe and is 
obviously meant to cover the whole Union. Moreover, article 255 EC is explicitly referred to in article 
28 EU as one of the EC provisions that shall apply to CFSP and it is presented in the EC Treaty as 
one of the ‘Provisions common to several institutions’.59  
As the Court of First Instance confirmed in the Svenska Journalistförbundet case in 1998,60 the 
fact that documents deal with matters that fall under Title V of the Treaty (CFSP) does not affect the 
jurisdiction of the Court. In that case Decision 93/731/EC on public access to Council documents was 
said to apply to all Council documents, irrespective of their content. This was confirmed in the Hautala 
case, a year later, in which the confidentiality of a CFSP document was questioned.61 On 14 
November 1996, the Finnish Member of the European Parliament, Ms. Heidi Hautala, asked a written 
question to the Council in order to seek clarification on the criteria which have been adopted at EU 
level for the export of conventional arms. The Council answered that the member states had agreed 
on common criteria with regard to arms exports in 1991 and 1992 and that the decision as to whether 
an authorization can be granted for exports and the procedures in that context, is governed by the 
national legislation of the member states. The Council also referred to a report from the Political 
Committee on Conventional Arms Exports, adopted on 14-15 November 1996. A request from Ms. 
Haulata to obtain access to this report was denied by the Council because the report would contain 
‘highly sensitive information, disclosure of which would undermine the protection of the public 
interests, as regards public security’. In response to a confirmatory application by Ms. Hautala the 
Council added that ‘disclosure of the report in question could be harmful for the EU’s relations with 
third countries’. Other arguments used by the Council included the fact that the document was 
exchanged via the COREU network and was therefore of a confidential nature, and the fact that the 
report was drafted for internal use and not intended to be made public. 
The Court of First Instance held that the Council has a certain discretion which is connected with 
the political responsibilities conferred on it by Title V of the Treaty and that it must determine the 
possible consequences which the disclosure of documents may have for the international relations of 
the Union. In those circumstances, any review by the CFI must be limited ‘to verifying whether the 
procedural rules have been complied with, the contested decision is properly reasoned, and the facts 
have been accurately stated, and whether there has been a manifest error of assessment of the facts 
or a misuse of powers’ (para. 72). The discretion of the Council is, however, not unrestricted. Both in 
the Svenska Journalistförbundet and the Hautala cases, the Court referred to the objective of the 
Decision of access to documents to give effect to the principle of the largest possible access for 
citizens to information with a view to strengthening the democratic character of the institutions and the 
trust of the public in the administration. Exceptions, therefore, should be construed and applied strictly, 
in a manner which does not defeat the application of the general rule. The Council is even obliged to 
examine whether partial access should be granted to the information not covered by the exceptions. 
‘In that connection, the principle of proportionality would allow the Council, in particular cases where 
the volume of the document or the passages to be removed would give rise to an unreasonable 
amount of administrative work, to balance the interest in public access to those fragmentary parts 
against the burden of work so caused. The Council could thus, in those particular cases, safeguard 
the interests of good administration’ (para. 86). 
More recent cases confirm the view that possible damage to the relations between the EU and third 
states may not automatically form a reason for the Council to deny public access to documents. In the 
case Kuijer I, the applicant – a university lecturer and researcher in asylum and immigration matters – 
requested access to certain documents containing information concerning the situation in third 
                                                                                                                                                        
obligation to provide extensive access to all documents in their possession (cf. also Case C-58/94, The 
Netherlands v.Council, and the Ombudsman’s Annual Report for 1996). 
59 Regarding PJCC a similar reference can be found in article 41 TEU. 
60 Case T-174/95 Svenska Journalistförbundet v. Council [1998] ECR II-2289, paras. 81-82. 
61 Case T-14/98, Heidi Hautala MEP v. Council of the European Union [1999] ECR II-2489. 
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countries or regions from which many asylum seekers originate or in which they reside.62 The Council 
had denied access, claiming that the reports contain very sensitive information about the political, 
economic and social situation in the countries. According to the Council the disclosure of this 
information might damage the relations between the EU and these countries. The Court (of First 
Instance) held that the decision of the Council did not satisfy the requirements governing the 
statement of reasons under article 190 EC as it did not explain the reasons for denying access to the 
individual documents that were requested. Thus, the Council produced a new decision, in which it 
explained that the reports had certain features in common which made it necessary to treat them in 
the same way. In addition, the Council repeated that disclosure of the information was potentially 
damaging to the Union’s relations with the countries in question. For Kuijer this decision formed a 
reason to commence a procedure for annulment once again. In this second case (Kuijer II), the Court 
for the first time considered the contents of the documents at issue.63 Kuijer II is important for the 
future possibilities of citizens to obtain access to CFSP documents. In the most crucial paragraphs 
(60-64) the Court held: 
‘[…] the mere fact that certain documents contain information or negative statements about a political 
situation, or the protection of human rights, in a third country does not necessarily mean that access to 
them may be denied on the basis that there is a risk that the public interest may be undermined. […] 
As regards their contents, the reports at issue do not concern directly or primarily the relations of the 
European Union with the countries concerned. […] 
The information frequently relates to facts which have already been made public, for example how the 
political, economic or social situation has developed in a country concerned’. 
Nevertheless, these cases have not prevented the Council from adopting a rather restrictive set of 
security regulations on 19 March 2001 (the judgement in Kuijer I was on 6 April 2000). On 26 July 
2000 COREPER already adopted a decision drafted by the General Secretary of the Council, Mr. 
Solana, to amend the 1993 Decision of access to documents. This ‘Solana Decision’ was formally 
approved by the Council (through a written procedure) on 14 August 2000 and excluded documents 
related to European Security and Defence Policy and classified as TRÈS SECRET/TOP SECRET, 
SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL, from the general rules on public access to documents.64 Top secret 
documents were documents whose disclosure ‘could cause extremely serious prejudice to the 
essential interests of the Union’. The strict security arrangements were thought to form a necessary 
element of the Interim Security Arrangements agreed on between the Secretaries General of NATO 
and the EU on 26 July 2000 to, inter alia, protect and safeguard information and material from NATO 
present at the EU’s Council Secretariat.65 A major problem concerning transparency was caused by 
the fact that the classified documents would not be referred to in the public register and that requests 
for access would no longer be considered by the Information Working Party, but by special security-
vetted personnel. 
The Solana Decision was severely criticized by the European Parliament (partly because of the 
‘secret’ adoption procedure during the time that Parliament was not in session) and by some member 
states. The EP and the Netherlands even started (separate) proceedings before the CFI against the 
Decision. In 2001, however, the Council agreed on new regulations, which led the Netherlands and 
the EP to withdraw their cases. On 19 March 2001, the Council replaced the Solana Decision by 
adopting a new set of security regulations which brought the classification rules into line with NATO 
standards.66 In fact this decision anticipated the adoption of the new general Regulation regarding 
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, which was adopted two 
                                                 
62 Case T-188/98, Aldo Kuijer v. Council of the European Union, [2000] ECR II-1959. 
63 Case T-211/00, Aldo Kuijer v. Council of the European Union, [2002] ECR II-485. This time it was easier for 
the Court as – on the basis of the amended Rules of Procedure of 28 November 2002 – it could itself 
actually ask for a disclosure of the documents in order to study them. 
64 Decision 2000/527/EC, OJ L 212/9, 23.08.2000. 
65 See the exchange of letters between Solana and Robertson of 26.7.00, published by Statewatch 
(<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/mar/16solana.htm>). 
66 Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001, OJ L 101/1, 11.4.2001. 
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months later.67 It is particularly in article 9 of the new Regulation in which the current regime on access 
to CFSP documents can be found. This provision – entitled ‘Treatment of sensitive documents’ – still 
echoes the Solana Decision as it introduces a special treatment for:  
‘documents originating from the institutions or the agencies established by them, from Member States, 
third countries or International Organisations, classified as ‘TRÈS SECRET/TOP SECRET’, ‘SECRET’ 
or ‘CONFIDENTIAL’ in accordance with the rules of the institutions concerned, which protect essential 
interests of the European Union or of one or more of its Member States in the areas covered by Article 
4(1)(a), notably public security, defence and military matters’.  
Article 4(1)(a) provides that the institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would 
undermine the protection of the public interest as regards: public security; defence and military 
matters; international relations; and the financial, monetary or economic policy of the Community or a 
member state. 
The current regime thus reflects a not too transparent system, in which sensitive documents are 
exempted from the regular rules on access to documents. They are to be handled by special (‘vetted’) 
personnel only (Art. 9(2)), and are recorded in the register or released only with the consent of the 
originator (para. 3). When a document is to be classified is decided by the institutions themselves on 
the basis of their own definition of ‘sensitivity’. The conditions for and limitations on public access 
cannot be found in the Regulation itself (as seems to be required by article 255 TEU), but in the 
various special arrangements adopted by the Institutions (like the Council Decision of 19 March 2001). 
The Regulation even goes beyond the Solana Decision as it is not restricted to foreign, security and 
defence documents, but covers international relations in general and even the financial, monetary or 
economic policy of the Community or a member state. The Council’s security decision makes clear 
that the regulations not only concern the Institutions, but even the member states. Article 2(2) of this 
Decision obligates the member states to take the appropriate measures to ensure that, when EU-
classified information is handled, the regulations are respected. The legality of this provision in a 
decision which is based on article 207(3) EC (allowing the Council to adopt its internal Rules of 
Procedure) has been questioned.68 Nevertheless, to oblige member states to consult with the 
institutions concerned whenever they receive a request for a document in their possession, returns in 
article 5 of the Regulation. 
All in all, the conclusion seems justified that the ambitions of the Union in the area of security and 
defence policy – for the fulfilment of which close cooperation with NATO is needed – have resulted in 
a stricter regime when access to sensitive documents is concerned. In March 2003 this new regime 
was laid down in an Agreement on the Security of Information between the EU and NATO.69 In itself, 
this is something we are used to when access to the documents of national Ministries for Foreign 
Affairs or Defence are concerned, and in that respect it is a logical consequence of the development of 
the Union towards a security organization. On the other hand, it is clear that the current regime is not 
too transparent concerning the reasons to classify the documents and it even entails a potential to 
broaden the scope of secrecy now that vague terms such as ‘public security’ and even the financial, 
monetary and economic policy of the Community or a member state are explicit reasons to deny 
access to documents. 
 
                                                 
67 Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of 30 May 2001, OJ L 145/43, 31.5.2001. See on this Regulation H.R. 
Kranenborg, ‘De Eurowob in de hand, de EU transparent?’, SEW, December 2002, p. 447-456. 
68 See in general on this issue: M. De Leeuw, Open Government in the EU: A Legal Analysis of a 
Fundamental Principle, dissertation European University Institute Florence, 2003. 
69 NATO Press Release (2003)022, 14 March 2003; and EU Council Decision 2003/211/CFSP of 24 February 
2003, OJ L 80, 27.3.2003, which contains the text of the Agreement. 
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4. Judicial Scrutiny of CFSP Decisions and Procedures 
4.1 The European Court of Justice 
Limited parliamentary control may to some extent be compensated by judicial control. With respect to 
CFSP (Title V), however, the powers of the Court of Justice are excluded by article 46 TEU. This was 
in line with the preference of most member states at the time of the Maastricht IGC because of 
possible integrative actions by the Court in this sensitive area. Even the Commission’s opinion 
reflected a clear reservation as it pointed to highly political and sensitive dimensions 
‘des actions mises en œuvre au cours de l’exercice de la politique étrangère ou de sécurité commune, 
qui ne sont pas soumises, en règle générale, au contrôle judiciaire’.70  
Or, as Everling put at the time: 
‘L’exclusion de la compétence de la Cour, prévue à l’article L [now 46; RAW] du traité sur l’Union, pour 
le contrôle des activités de l’Union en dehors des domaines des Communautés, est l’expression d’un 
déclin de confiance du public envers la jurisprudence de la Cour. Quelques formulations pour le moins 
étonnantes du récent arrêt de la Cour constitutionnelle allemand concernant le traité de Maastricht 
confirment cette impression’.71 
On the other hand, the first Dutch Draft Treaty at the time allowed the Court to ‘review [...] the legality 
of the application of the procedures for deciding upon the joint action referred to in this Title of the 
Treaty’, but this provision lacked the necessary consensus and it did not make it to the final Draft.72 
This is not to say that the CFSP provisions are not at all relevant for the European Court of 
Justice.73 According to article 47 TEU, nothing in the Treaty shall affect the Community Treaties or the 
subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying or supplementing them. On the basis of article 46, this 
provision falls under the competence of the Court. This implies that the Court has been given the 
competence to guard the preservation of the acquis communautaire.74 One may argue that on this 
basis the Court is competent to take into account CFSP decisions that are related to Community 
policies, and that it may even annul (parts of) CFSP decisions that would harm the acquis 
communautaire.75 It has even been argued that the adjudication of such cases might entail an 
incidental review of the guidelines of the European Council on their compatibility with EC law, thus 
subjecting the European Council to the indirect scrutiny of the Court of Justice,76 but the Court’s case 
                                                 
70 Working Document of the Commission SEC (91) 500, 15 May 1991, p. 41, quoted by L. Pliakos, ‘La nauture 
juridique de l’Union européenne’, 2 Revue trimestrielle de droit européen, 1993, p. 208-213, at p. 199, note 
56. 
71 U. Everling, ‘L’avenir de l’organisation jurisdictionelle de l’Union européenne’, in G. Versanden (ed.), La 
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72 See for the Draft Treaties: F. Laursen and S. Vanhoonacker, supra note 31. 
73 Cf. also the Court’s opinion on this matter in its Report on the implementation of the Treaty on European 
Union, 1995; and the Report of the EP’s Commission on Institutional Affairs (Rothley Report) on the Role of 
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74 This is a reason why stated that ‘Article L [now 46; RAW] constitutes the rule of recognition of the 
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is obviously in contrast to the findings in the present study, D.A.O. Edward, ‘Is Art. L of the Maastricht Treaty 
workable?’, Europarecht, supplement 2, 1995, p. 23-25, at p. 23. 
75 Cf. also M.R Eaton, ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’, in D. O’Keeffe and P. Twomey (eds.), supra 
note 29, p. 215-226, at p. 221 and S. Peers, ‘National Security and European Law’, Yearbook of European 
Law, 1996/1997, p. 363-404, at p. 398-399. 
76 U. Everling, ‘Reflections on the Structure of the European Union’, Common Market Law Review, 1992, p. 
1053-1077, at p. 1063; P.J.G. Kapteyn, ‘Inleidende beschouwingen over het Verdrag betreffende de 
Europese Unie’, SEW, 1992, p. 667-673, at p. 671 and T. Heukels and J. de Zwaan, supra note 29, p. 224. 
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law as reflected in, for instance, the Roujansky and Bonnamy cases seems to exclude this 
possibility.77 
A role of the Court seems to be permitted, or indeed required, whenever member states evade 
Community procedures by dealing with certain issues under CFSP and when, in particular, these 
decisions would conflict with the loyalty obligation as laid down in article 10 of the EC Treaty. In those 
cases the Court would be obliged to intervene – perhaps upon a request from the Commission. The 
loyalty obligation in article 10 EC extends to the external relations of the Community, including the 
actions that are explicitly linked to CFSP operations. This would mean that article 10 EC prohibits 
actions outside the Community framework that could harm the Community’s development, even when 
these actions are taken within the broader framework of the European Union. Related problems may 
occur when the implementation of CFSP obligations by national authorities gives rise to a problem of 
Community law.78 Finally, with regard to the budgetary competences of the European Parliament, one 
could even envisage this institution bringing a case before the Court concerning the misuse of certain 
EC funds for CFSP purposes when a CFSP decision is prima facie incompatible with Community 
budgetary regulations. 
These observations underline that the Court of Justice is the ultimate arbiter in deciding where 
the line of demarcation between the Union’s issue-areas lies. Examples of cases in which the Court of 
Justice has declared its own competence in relation to foreign policy issues can in particular be found 
in the judgements on the Community’s sanctions legislation. Since 1995 a number of cases have been 
referred to the Court by national courts in relation to the Yugoslav sanctions and some plaintiffs have 
initiated legal proceedings against the Council of Ministers for damage which they suffered pursuant to 
the sanctions against Iraq. Many of these cases challenged the national implementation of Community 
legislation (Bosphorus, Centro-com and Ebony Maritime), while the validity of Community legislation 
withdrawing preferences from Yugoslavia in 1991 has also been challenged (Racke).79 The Centro-
com judgement in particular clarified a number of long-disputed issues concerning the relationship 
between sanctions and the EC’s common commercial policy and the question of whether sanctions 
were commercial policy, or at least affected commercial policy. Despite the recognition by the Court 
that member states retained national competence over foreign and security policy, it pointed out that 
sanctions are a part of Community commercial policy and that national competences in the field of 
foreign policy still had to be exercised in accordance with Community law whenever they concern the 
imposition of economic sanctions. 
In addition, we have seen that the Court made clear that wherever access to information is 
concerned no distinction is made on the basis of the content of the requested document (the Svenska 
Journalistförbundet case).80 Despite the fact that the case concerned access to a document related to 
Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (CJHA), the language used in the judgement enabled it to be 
applied to CFSP as well. The Court (of First Instance) based its argument on the above-mentioned 
Decision 93/731/EC on public access to Council documents and continued: 
‘The fact that the Court has, by virtue of Article L [now Article 46; RAW] of the EU Treaty, no 
jurisdiction to review the legality of measures adopted under Title VI does not curtail its jurisdiction in 
the matter of public access to those measures. The assessment of the legality of the contested 
                                                 
77 Cases C-253/94p and C-264/94p respectively. The Court in these cases ruled that decisions of the 
European Council cannot be challenged by a request for annulment. See also D.M. Curtin and R.H. van 
Ooik, ‘Een Hof van Justitie van de Europese Unie?’, SEW, 1999, p. 24-38, at p. 27. 
78 See also H.G. Krenzler and H.C. Schneider, ‘Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der 
Europäischen Union – Zur Frage der Kohärenz’, 2 Europarecht, 1994, p. 144-161, at p. 157-159; M. 
Pechstein, ‘Das Kohärenzgebot als entscheidende Integrationsdimension der Europäischen Union’, 3 
Europarecht, 1995, p. 247-258, at p. 258 and P. Gilsdorf, ’Les réserves de sécurité du Traité CEE, à la 
lumière du Traté sur l’Union Européenne’, 374 Revue du Marché commun et de l’Union européenne, 1994, 
p. 17-25. 
79 Cases C-84/95, Bosphorus; Case C-124/95, Centro-com; C-177/95, Ebony Maritime; and C-162/96, Racke. 
See for an analysis of these cases: S. Peers, ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy 1995-6’, Yearbook of 
European Law, 1996/1997, p. 611-644. 
80 More implicitly this was already accepted by the Court in Case T-194/94, Carvel. Cf. D.M. Curtin and R.H. 
van Ooik, supra note 77, p. 25. 
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decision is based upon its jurisdiction to review the legality of decisions of the Council taken under 
Decision 93/731, on the basis of Article 173 [now Article 230; RAW] of the EC Treaty, and does not in 
any way bear upon the intergovernmental cooperation in the spheres of Justice and Home Affairs as 
such’.81 
This implies that CFSP documents would be treated in the same way as Community documents. 
Another example of the Court’s willingness to review the legality of a Council act adopted under a 
non-Community provision can be found in the Airport transit visas case.82 In this case the Court 
declared an annulment action under article 173 EC (now art. 230) to be admissible for the purposes of 
reviewing the content of a CJHA Joint Action in the light of ex article 100c EC but subsequently 
dismissed the action as a matter of substance. In the final analysis, however, the Court did not shy 
away from the possibility that it would actually annul an act adopted in the context of the non-
Community areas pursuant to article 173 EC. The Court made clear that it is prepared to police the 
activity of the Council within the European Union as a whole. This implies that even CFSP Decisions 
are not ‘untouchable’ when it is claimed that a Community legal basis should have been used. The 
Court’s competence in this regard is based on article 47 TEU, which makes no distinction between 
CFSP and Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC), but instead provides that 
nothing in the TEU shall affect the Community treaties.83 The Court of first instance will have a chance 
to settle this question in two cases before it regarding the validity of Council Decision 1999/612/CFSP 
concerning additional restrictive measures against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This Decision 
includes a list of persons being subject to an obligation of non-admission in the territories of the 
Member States. The applicants in the two cases – Miskovic and Karic –  challenge the choice of legal 
base by the Council and claim that measures concerning immigration and asylum policy fall within the 
exclusive competence under Title IV EC and not under Title V EU (CFSP).84  It will be interesting to 
see what the effect on the CFSP decision will be when the Court accepts the arguments of the 
applicants. 
Finally, it has been argued, following the Foto-Frost line of reasoning, that this role of the Court 
implies that a national court must refer a question on the validity of a measure adopted in the context 
of CFSP and PJCC under the article 234 EC mechanism.85 Indeed the possible use of article 234 EC 
is not a priori excluded in cases where the legal basis of a CFSP Decision that has been implemented 
on the national level is questioned by individuals before a national court.86 
While recent case law thus indicates that the Court of Justice is increasingly seen as the Court of 
the European Union,87 it remains clear that the current regime regarding legal protection reveals a 
number of shortcomings. The most obvious lack of judicial control is apparent when competences and 
decision-making procedures within the CFSP legal order are at stake. In that case, there are no 
possibilities for the Court to scrutinize either the decision-making procedures or the legal basis chosen 
for a CFSP decision. This means, for instance, that neither the Commission, nor the European 
Parliament can commence a procedure before the Court in cases where the Council has ignored their 
rights and competences in CFSP decision-making procedures. As far as the legal basis for decisions 
is concerned, there are no possibilities for the institutions or the member states to request the opinion 
of the Court. It is important to note that this brings about a situation in which the interpretation and 
implementation of the CFSP provisions (including the procedures to be followed) is left entirely to the 
Council. Keeping in mind their preference for ‘intergovernmental’ cooperation where CFSP is 
concerned, it may be understandable that member states at the time of the negotiations had the 
                                                 
81 Para. 85. 
82 Case C-170/96, Commission v. Council. 
83 Cf. D.M. Curtin and R.H. van Ooik, supra note 77. 
84  Case T-349/99, Miroslav Miskovic v. Council of the European Union; and Case T-350/99 Bogoljub Karic and 
four others v. Council of the European Union, OJ 2000, C 79/35-36. 
85 Case 314/85, Foto-Frost. See D.M. Curtin and I.F. Dekker, ‘The European Union as a ‘Layered’ 
International Organization: Institutional Unity in Disguise’, in P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds.), The Evolution 
of EU Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press,1999, p. 83-136, at p. 47. 
86 Along the same lines D.M. Curtin and R.H. van Ooik, supra note 77, p. 27. 
87 Ibidem; and D.M. Curtin and I.F. Dekker, supra note 85, p. 27 
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strong desire to prevent a body of ‘Union law’ coming into being by way of judicial activism on the part 
of the European Court of Justice,88 but it is less understandable that they were also reluctant to allow 
for judicial control of the procedural arrangements they explicitly agreed upon (although it is 
acknowledged that it may be difficult to unlink procedures and content). 
Furthermore, the non-justiciability of the consistency requirement in article 3 TEU results in a 
situation in which this requirement is reduced (as far as judicial control is concerned) to the extent that 
it is covered by article 47 (preservation of the acquis communautaire). This means, first of all, that the 
CFSP decisions cannot be adjudicated as to their conformity with the overall consistency of the 
Union’s external policy (that is in relation to other CFSP decisions or PJCC decisions);89 and, 
secondly, that the Court is not allowed to view Community decisions in relation to the prerogatives or 
obligations of the member states in the areas of the Union.90 
This leads us to conclude that the Court of Justice is left with a limited set of possibilities. First of 
all, the Court is allowed to review the required compatibility of CFSP measures of the Council with 
Community law, including the choice of legal basis (EC or CFSP) and the consistency of foreign policy 
measures (‘policing the boundaries’). This includes the Court’s use of the non-judiciable CFSP 
provisions as aids of interpretation.91 Secondly, it seems clear that the Court has jurisdiction whenever 
the Council makes use of ‘hybrid’ acts, covering both matters governed by CFSP as well as matters 
governed by the Community Treaties.92 Examples could be found in the area of economic sanctions, 
development policy or trade policy. And, finally, it is obvious that whenever issues fall under the 
Community’s competence, article 46 TEU cannot be interpreted so as to affect the existing powers of 
the Court related to external policy issues. This means that the Court’s competences for instance 
extend to international agreements concluded by the Community (Article 300 EC, including mixed 
agreements), to trade policy (Article 133 EC), visas, asylum and immigration policy (Title IV EC), the 
human rights principles in article 6, paragraph 2 TEU as general principles of Community law,93 or 
development policy (Title XX EC) – regardless of possible relations of measures in these areas with 
CFSP issues. In fact, because of the close connection between some CFSP and EC decisions one 
comes across references to CFSP decisions in judgments of the Court (of first instance) more often. 
The judgements concerning sanctions against the former Yugoslavia and against individuals on the 
basis of anti-terrorism measures form a case in point. After all, in these situations the Community 
measures found a direct source in CFSP common positions.94 
 
4.2 The National Courts 
Already in Van Gend & Loos, the Court of Justice made clear that ‘the object of the EEC is to establish 
a common market the operation of which directly affects the subjects of the Community’. The national 
courts in particular are entrusted with ensuring the legal protection of citizens, a role for the courts 
which in the view of the Court of Justice follows from the cooperation principle of article 10 EC95 and 
from the task assigned to the Court under article 234 EC (the preliminary rulings), 
‘the object of which is to secure uniform interpretation of the Treaty by national courts and tribunals, 
[and which] confirms that the states have acknowledged that Community law has an authority which 
can be invoked by their nationals before those courts and tribunals’.96 
This resulted in the rule that: 
                                                 
88 Cf. N. Neuwahl, supra note 30, p. 244. 
89 See also M. Pechstein, supra note 78, p. 258. 
90 See more extensively R.A. Wessel, supra note 5. 
91 Cf. Case C-473/93, Commission v. Luxembourg, on article F, para. 1 TEU (now art. 6).  
92 See also N. Neuwahl, supra note 30, p. 246. 
93 Cf. in this line also the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in the Bosphorus case (C-84/95). 
94  See in particular Cases T-306/01 R, Aden; T-47/03 R, Sison; and C-317/00 P(R), ‘Invest’ Import and Export. 
95 Case 33/76, Rewe Zentralfinanz et al. v. Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland. 
96 Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos, p. 12. 
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‘every national court must, in a case within its jurisdiction, apply Community law in its entirety [...] and 
must accordingly set aside any provision of national law which may conflict with it, whether prior or 
subsequent to the Community rule’.97 
It would be interesting to know the Court’s views on the possibility of CFSP provisions being invoked 
before national courts. Although the issue is not agreed upon in the Treaty, it is generally held that 
CFSP decisions are not ‘self-executing’, in the sense that they may be relied upon by national courts.98 
It is indeed difficult to find provisions in the CFSP decisions containing rights and/or obligations for 
individuals. This is not to say that individuals cannot be affected at all by CFSP decisions. Despite the 
fact that practice has not yet called for conclusive statements in this respect, there are no reasons to 
exclude the direct effect of CFSP decisions in general.  
In general, rules in the legal order of either the member states or an international organization 
may provide for international norms to be applied in relation to certain legal subjects only (e.g. EC 
Directives) or only after a transformation into national law. The notion of direct effect may be 
distinguished from this applicability in that it only becomes relevant when norms do not have the effect 
they purport to have and citizens wish to invoke a norm before a national judge. Even if a norm is 
directly applicable – in the sense that it has a function between the legal subjects within a national 
legal order – there may be reasons not to allow individuals to invoke it in a court of law. 
This means that in order to establish the status of CFSP norms in national legal orders, we have 
to look for clues in either the international order, the national legal orders, or the EU legal order 
indicating the direct applicability, the direct effect and the hierarchical status of CFSP norms. General 
international law, obviously, is silent about this issue and doctrine generally reflects the principle that 
states are free to decide on how they want to give effect to international law in their national legal 
orders.99 The constitutions of the fifteen EU member states indeed differ in this respect. But, as 
became clear from the development of the European Community, this issue can authoritatively be 
settled by norms in the supranational order of an international organization. The principles of direct 
applicability, direct effect and supremacy were recognized by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) as 
forming part of the ‘new legal order’ regulating the relationship between the EC and its member states, 
as well as with the legal subjects within the states (natural and legal persons). 
Unlike the EC, we have seen that the non-Community parts of the Union largely fall outside the 
reach of the ECJ. This means that, for the time being, we cannot rely on authoritative interpretations of 
the Court regarding the status of CFSP norms in the national legal orders. However, the Treaty itself is 
not completely silent in this respect. In a recent study, Curtin and Dekker claim that, in principle, Union 
law is directly applicable in the national legal orders of the member states.100 They base this 
conclusion on the fact that with regard to the new types of EU decisions introduced by the Amsterdam 
Treaty, the ‘framework decisions’ and ‘decisions’, the Treaty explicitly provides that they ‘shall not 
entail direct effect’ (Art. 35 TEU). This provision would only make sense when these types of decision 
could in principle have direct effect. Irrespective of the inherent danger in using a contrario arguments, 
its acceptance would provide an argument in favour of the direct applicability of EU norms in general, 
since the exclusion of direct effect only becomes relevant in the case of direct applicability. 
Although this example is drawn from the provision of police and judicial cooperation and not from 
the provisions of foreign and security policy, there is no compelling reason to differentiate between the 
two substantive Union areas in this respect. The direct applicability of CFSP norms would then result 
in the possibility – and even the necessity – of using these norms in the relationships between all legal 
subjects within the national legal order. Administrative as well as judicial organs could invoke them, 
but the same holds true for citizens and companies in their mutual relations. This is not to say that all 
norms by definition could be invoked in national court proceedings. Just as with Community norms, 
this would depend on the nature of the norm (sufficiently clear and precise), which in this case would 
                                                 
97 Case 106/77, Simmenthal, p. 644. 
98 See for instance D.M. Curtin and R.H. van Ooik, supra note 77, p. 30-31. 
99 See for instance A. Cassese, International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, chapter 8. 
100 D.M. Curtin and I.F. Dekker, ‘The Constitutional Structure of the European Union: Some Reflections on 
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ultimately be decided by the national courts. Curtin and Dekker claim that Union norms, at least, could 
have an ‘indirect effect’, meaning that ‘all national authorities have the obligation to interpret national 
legislation and other measures as much as possible in the light of the wording and purpose of valid 
Union law’.101 This, however, implies an acceptance of the supremacy of Union law over national law. 
After all, ‘indirect effect’ only becomes relevant in the case of a (possible) conflict between an EU and 
a national norm. Curtin and Dekker, more or less implicitly, base this supremacy on the principle of 
loyalty, as laid down in article 10 EC as one of the leading principles in the constitution of the Union 
entailing an obligation for national authorities to interpret national law as far as possible in conformity 
with these decisions (only limited by the restrictions imposed by the ECJ regarding the application of 
the principle of indirect effect).102 
It is probably too early to come up with definite statements like these regarding the effect of 
CFSP norms in the national legal orders. Nevertheless, direct applicability in the more limited definition 
presented earlier (using the norms in the relationships between all legal subjects within the national 
legal order) seems to follow from all of the above assumptions. However, it is generally held that 
CFSP decisions are not directly effective, in the sense that they may be relied upon by national 
courts.103 It is indeed difficult to find provisions in the CFSP decisions containing rights and/or 
obligations for individuals. This is not to say that individuals cannot be affected at all by CFSP 
decisions. Regardless of the undetermined status of CFSP provisions in the Treaty on European 
Union, national constitutional systems may offer national courts the opportunity to allow individuals to 
invoke directly effective provisions in cases brought before them. Thus, the Dutch Constitution, for 
instance, provides in article 93 that provisions in treaties or in decisions of international organizations 
have binding force in the Dutch legal order when they are directly effective. The latter question is 
decided upon by the courts. 
Examples of potentially directly effective provisions may be found in the sanction decisions, 
although the actual obligations in these cases are mostly laid down in Community Regulations (which 
may be invoked by individuals on the basis of the EC rules on direct effect). Some CFSP decisions 
imposing sanctions, however, do not require a follow-up in the form of an EC Regulation, such as the 
decisions to impose an arms embargo on Afghanistan, Burma/Myanmar, Nigeria or Sudan.104 In these 
cases it would be the CFSP decision itself that would need to be invoked before a national court. The 
same holds true regarding CFSP decisions establishing criteria or exceptions with respect to sanctions 
imposed on third countries. Common Position 95/544/CFSP, for instance, provided inter alia for an 
interruption of all contacts with Nigeria in the field of sports through the denial of visas to official 
delegations and national teams. Unlike other provisions in this Common Provision – which obligate 
member states to take ‘in accordance with national law such measures as are appropriate’ – this 
provision does not seem to be in need of national implementation measures. Another example is 
Council Decision 97/820/CFSP, allowing for member states to make exceptions to the sanctions 
imposed on Nigeria. On the basis of this decision and subject to certain conditions, member states 
may derogate from these rules. 
A final situation in which national courts could become involved in CFSP issues, would arise in 
cases of an (alleged) liability of member states being brought up. In cases where neither the 
Communities nor the European Union could be held liable for decisions taken by the Council in the 
area of CFSP, third states or individuals will have to turn to the national courts of the member states to 
seek justice. Situations in this respect could for instance arise whenever member states cause 
damage in the course of an EU action (such as in the case of the military missions of the Union in 
Macedonia or Congo) or when member states are held liable for breaches of an agreement concluded 
by the Union on the basis of article 24 TEU. 
The main problem, however, is that all decisions imposing sanctions – EC as well as CFSP – are 
normally transposed into national legislation. Nevertheless, the original CFSP decision could play a 
                                                 
101 Ibidem. See on the principle of indirect effect for instance G. Betlem, ‘The Principle of Indirect Effect of 
Community Law’, European Public Law, 1995, p. 1. 
102 In particular the principle of non-retroactivity in criminal liability. See for instance P. Craig and G. De Búrca, 
Eu Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 198-210. 
103 See for instance D.M. Curtin and R.H. van Ooik, supra note 77, p. 30-31. 
104 Common Positions 96/746/CFSP, 96/635/CFSP, 95/515/CFSP, and 94/165/CFSP respectively. 
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role in a proceeding whenever its indirect effect would be accepted. Furthermore, we would need a 
citizen or a company from that third state to challenge the trade or travel restrictions, in which case the 
company in the EU member state could point to his obligations on the basis of the CFSP decision. 
Direct applicability only refers to this rightful reference to valid norms and the case is thus not 
completely incomprehensible. It is not even unthinkable that a national court would also allow this 
decision to have direct effect, in the sense that it may play a role in a national court proceeding. The 
problem, however, seems to be that in cases like this one cannot escape from dealing with the 
question of the supremacy of the CFSP norms over previously established (or maybe even future) 
national law. The principle of loyalty may prove to be a valuable candidate as a basis for the general 
supremacy of EU law, but at least in the area of foreign policy this issue has not yet fully blossomed. 
 
4.3 The International Court of Justice 
On the basis of article 292 EC member states are not to submit a dispute concerning Community law 
to any method of settlement other than those provided for in the EC Treaty. A similar provision has not 
been included in the Treaty on European Union. In fact, Title V TEU creates obligations which are 
binding in international law but not (or to a minor extent only) in Community law, and these obligations 
have in general been excluded from interference by the EC Court. The fact that CFSP provisions are 
not subject to the rule in article 292 EC, nor to a similar provision in the TEU, raises the question 
whether these provisions are justiciable before the International Court of Justice. All EU member 
states are members of the United Nations, which makes them ipso facto parties to the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (Article 93, United Nations Charter). Whenever states have accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Court,105 it may decide on cases referred to it with regard to a) the interpretation of a 
treaty; b) any question of international law; c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would 
constitute a breach of an international obligation; or d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be 
made for the breach of an international obligation (Article 36 of the Court’s Statute). 
Hence, there are no reasons a priori to exclude the jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice concerning the CFSP provisions in the TEU and the Council decisions that are based upon 
them.106 It is difficult, however, to imagine concrete cases that would be suitable for being brought to 
the Court’s attention. Possibilities to sue another member state for maintaining a national policy where 
CFSP provisions would call for a common policy are limited. The provisions on systematic cooperation 
provide sufficient safeguards against member states still maintaining conflicting national policy. 
Moreover, there is not much sense in challenging a decision that was adopted unanimously. Only in a 
case decided upon by qualified majority voting (and where a member state was outvoted) would there 
be any reason to question, for instance, the legal basis of the decision. In addition, one could imagine 
the non-implementation of CFSP measures by a member state (and, in the absence thereof, a Council 
decision because of the requirement of an unanimous vote) being brought before the International 
Court. 
More importantly, however, it is very unlikely that member states will bring legal CFSP issues 
before the International Court of Justice. In their view, any action before this Court would probably 
harm not only the further development of CFSP (which to a large extent depends on the development 
of mutual trust and cooperation), but also the member state’s image as a serious player in the field. 
Nevertheless, it is equally clear that the International Court of Justice may play a role whenever 
relations with third states are concerned. In that respect, however, it is important to make a distinction 
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between acts of the member states and acts of the European Union, since article 34, paragraph 1, of 
the Court’s Statute provides that only states may be parties in cases before the Court. 
 
5. Good Governance as a Substantive Foreign Policy Objective 
5.1 Use of ‘Formal’ CFSP Legal Bases 
Apart from reforming governance in the European Union, the Commission’s White Paper also looks 
into the EU’s contribution to global governance. 
‘The objectives of peace, growth, employment and social justice pursued within the Union must also 
be promoted outside for them to be effectively attained at both European and global level’ (p. 26). 
Indeed, according to article 11 TEU one of the objectives of the Union’s foreign and security policy is 
‘to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms’. In order to be able to pursue this objective, the Union can make use of the 
general means, described in article 12 TEU: Common Strategies, Joint Actions and Common 
Positions.  
Many Joint Actions entail concrete support activities in third countries. These may vary from 
support of the Union for the democratic development of a country to a contribution to the solution of a 
serious crisis. Decisions on Joint Actions that somehow concern the support of development in third 
countries reveal the Union’s concern with a variety of issues. Joint Actions may set out a general 
policy to support the democratic development in a particular third country (e.g. support for the 
Government of Montenegro, for Republica Srpska or for Zaire),107 but they may also focus on a more 
specific situation (e.g. assistance for mine-clearance in Croatia, a contribution to the re-establishment 
of a viable police force in Albania or support for the Palestinian Authority in its efforts to counter 
terrorist activities).108 Supporting democratic developments is often pursued through the sending of 
observers to elections (e.g. in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of Congo or 
Nigeria).109 And, finally, Joint Actions often form the basis for the nomination of a Special Envoy (e.g. 
for the Middle-East peace process, the city of Mostar, the African Great Lakes region, the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia or Kosovo).110 
Common Positions are used for two different functions in relation to the promotion of global 
governance. A substantial number of Decisions relate to the imposition of arms embargoes or the 
reduction of economic and financial relations.111 Most Decisions on economic sanctions reiterate a 
resolution of the United Nations Security Council on the same topic. In most cases additional 
Community measures are required on the basis of articles 301 EC and 60 EC,112 which results in 
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111 Other types of sanctions are not excluded, but rarely occur. An example of an unfriendly (but probably not 
illegal act) concerns the decision on the non-admission to the EU of government officials of Belarus in 
reaction to certain measures, by the Government of Belarus affecting the residences of ambassadors from 
several EU member states. As a first reaction the EU member states had already recalled their 
ambassadors from Minsk for consultations. See Common Position 98/448/CFSP of 9 July 1998 (repealed by 
Council Decision 1999/156/CFSP of 22 February 1999). Cf. also Common Position 98/725/CFSP of 14 
December 1998 on restrictive measures against persons in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
112 Clear exceptions include the decisions on the imposition of an arms embargo: Council Decision 
94/165/CFSP of 15 March 1994 concerning the imposition of an embargo on arms, munitions and military 
equipment on Sudan; Common Position 96/184/CFSP of 26 February 1996 concerning arms exports to the 
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subsequent EC or ECSC decisions.113 The fact that binding United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
resolutions are repeated in specific CFSP decisions may appear odd at first sight. An eventual 
absence of a CFSP decision would of course not affect the obligatory force of the Security Council 
Resolution. The reason for adopting CFSP decisions is nevertheless – apart from securing the direct 
effect of the SC Resolution – to be found in the system of the TEU, in which, according to article 301 
EC, economic sanctions by the Community require a prior political CFSP decision. Since the individual 
Security Council resolutions need to be implemented in Community legislation as well, the adoption of 
Community Regulations on the basis of article 301 EC (or art. 60 EC) is a necessary course to be 
followed. 
Apart from decisions implementing Security Council resolutions, ‘independent’ CFSP decisions 
on economic sanctions are also possible. An example can be found in a Common Position on the 
imposition of an oil embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which does not find a basis in 
a Security Council resolution. These independent EU sanctions are of an equally unconditional nature. 
They may impose a general arms embargo (like in the case of Sudan) or introduce a diversity of 
measures such as visa restrictions (Yugoslavia and Belarus) or the suspension of development 
cooperation (as was the case regarding Nigeria).114 
A second category concerns more positive policies of the Union vis-à-vis third states. However, 
Regardless of what one might have expected on the basis of the Treaty text,115 Common Positions are 
used less frequently to define the policy of the Union vis-à-vis a particular third state. It has proven to 
be difficult to fix the policy of the Union in an actual decision. Nevertheless, the instrument has been 
used by the Union to express its attitude concerning particular events in the third country in question. 
Thus the Union for instance ‘condemns the human rights abuses’ (Nigeria), or ‘is concerned at the 
absence of progress towards democratization’ (Burma/Myanmar).116 More importantly, however, 
Common Positions concerning the policy of the Union vis-à-vis a third state in general contain the 
objectives of the Union, together with the measures to achieve these objectives. Examples of 
objectives are ‘to improve the situation in East Timor regarding respect for human rights’,117 ‘to support 
the dialogue’ or ‘to support the coordinated efforts of the international Community’ (Angola),118 ‘to 
assist the Burundi Government in organizing a national debate [...]’,119 ‘to support democratic 
development in Ukraine’ or ‘to continue to provide assistance for the process of nuclear disarmament’ 
(Ukraine).120 Generally, the objectives of Common Positions have a wide scope and are rather 
ambitious. Objectives such as ‘to bring a sustainable peace in Afghanistan’ or ‘to encourage, stimulate 
and support the process of recovery from genocide, promotion of national reconciliation […] and 
protection and promotion of human rights […]’ (Rwanda) are not exceptional.121 
                                                                                                                                                        
former Yugoslavia; Common Position 96/746/CFSP of 17 December 1996 concerning the imposition of an 
embargo on arms, munitions and military equipment on Afghanistan; Common Position 98/409/CFSP of 29 
June 1998 concerning Sierra Leone; and Common Position 1999/206/CFSP of 15 March 1999 on the 
imposition of an embargo on the export of arms, munitions and military equipment on Ethiopia and Eritrea. 
113 Because of the absence of an article 301 EC counterpart in the ECSC Treaty, the ECSC decisions on 
economic sanctions are taken as a ‘Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States, meeting within the Council’. 
114 See Council Decision 94/165/CFSP of 15 March 1994 concerning the imposition of an arms embargo on 
Sudan; Common Position 98/725/CFSP of 14 December 1998 on restrictive measures against persons in 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; and Common Position 98/448/CFSP of 9 July 1998 (repealed by 
Council Decision 1999/156/CFSP of 22 February 1999) on Belarus. The Common Position on Nigeria of 20 
November 1995 (95/515/CFSP) introduces and reaffirms a number of economic and political sanctions 
against that country. 
115 According to article 15 Common Positions shall also be used to define the approach of the Union to a 
particular matter of a geographical nature. 
116 Common Position 95/515/CFSP of 20 November 1995 and Common Position 96/635/CFSP of 28 October 
1996 respectively. 
117 Common Position 96/407/CFSP of 25 June 1996. 
118 Common Position 95/413/CFSP of 2 October 1995. 
119 Common Position 95/91/CFSP of 24 March 1995. 
120 Common Position 94/779/CFSP of 28 November 1994. 
121 See Common Positions 98/108/CFSP of 26 January 1998 and 1999/73/CFSP of 25 January 1999 
(Afghanistan) and Common Position 98/252/CFSP of 30 March 1998 (Rwanda). 
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5.2 Use of ‘Informal’ CFSP Legal Bases 
However, apart from these formal instruments, the systematic cooperation which on the basis of article 
13(3) TEU is to take place between the member states, may result in some additional outcomes. The 
purpose of the systematic cooperation between the member states is ‘to ensure that their combined 
influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action’ (the last 
part of art. 16). The outcome of the systematic cooperation in this respect may be rather invisible to 
outsiders, since in many cases the agreement on concerted and convergent action is not laid down in 
one of the formal CFSP instruments. Decisions to that end are therefore to be discovered in 
Presidential Declarations, or in ‘Declarations’, ‘Conclusions’, ‘Decisions’ or ‘Action Plans’ of the 
Council that are not based on specific legal bases and are not always made public. Even oral 
agreements between member states or statements made by the Presidency and tacitly accepted by 
the member states may serve as a source for concerted action.122 
The systematic cooperation can subsequently be implemented by either the member states 
individually (for instance through similar diplomatic démarches by their representatives in third states), 
by a combination of national initiatives and Union initiatives (for instance when national démarches are 
supported by a Presidential declaration or démarches by the Troika), or by autonomous actions of the 
Union (when member states decide to leave a particular issue to be dealt with by the Presidency or 
the Troika, in which case a third state is believed to be confronted with a single, but strong actor).123 
Practice has shown a divergent picture of actions and reactions, but the systematic cooperation 
is nevertheless considered to be one of the most important elements of CFSP by the policy-makers 
involved.124 The ‘informal’ decisions of the Council are not by definition less influential than Common 
Positions or Joint Actions.125 Thus, a concerted action towards the human rights situation in Turkey, 
because of its structural nature, is of extreme importance not only for the future relationship between 
the EU and Turkey, but also for the relationship between the EU and Iran, Russia and the CIS 
republics in the region. And, the failure to reach consensus on a declaration on the human rights 
situation in China in 1997 had all to do with the position of the EU vis-à-vis China and with the battle 
between Japan and the US concerning access to the Chinese market (and even more concretely with 
the planned visit of the French President to China, the question whether China would buy Boeing or 
Airbus aircraft, employment in Airbus-producing EU member states, the competition between 
American and European industries, and the survival of a European high-tech industrial cooperation 
project).126 
An outstanding example of a decision which may partly be based on article 13, paragraph 3, is 
the ‘Declaration’. Most opinions of the European Union concerning CFSP issues are not presented in 
one of the formal decision types mentioned in article 12; instead they are expressed as ‘Declarations’. 
It is striking that, now that the Treaty explicitly mentions the types of decisions in which the opinions of 
the Union are to be expressed, the instrument of ‘Declaration’ has not lost the popularity it gained in 
the period of European Political Cooperation (EPC). In fact, each year shows a larger number of CFSP 
Declarations leading up to the current average of one Declaration almost every three days. 127 
In practice, CFSP systematic cooperation as well as concerted and convergent action has also 
proved important with regard to the so-called ‘political dialogues’ with third countries. Political 
dialogues as such cannot be found in the Treaty on European Union, but are established on the basis 
of general association treaties, decisions, declarations, or simply on the basis of an exchange of 
                                                 
122 Keukeleire, supra note 34, at 186. 
123 Ibidem, p. 185. 
124 Ibidem, p. 230. 
125 Ph. Willaert and C. Marques-Ruiz, supra note 106, p. 70. 
126 Taken from Keukeleire, supra note 34, at 230. 
127 Joint Actions and Common Positions are together adopted on average 27 times yearly, which means one 
CFSP Decision every two weeks.  
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letters.128 Since the entry into force of the TEU, political dialogues take place in the framework of 
CFSP. They are seen as a means of attaining the objectives in article 11 and may cover: 
– an exchange of views and information on political questions of mutual interest; 
– the identification of areas suitable for an enlarged cooperation on the basis of a greater confidence 
between the different actors on the international scene; 
– the adoption of joint positions and actions in relation to existing international problems.129 
Dialogue meetings can take place at different levels. The highest level is that of the Presidency 
(together with the President of the Commission). Lower levels are the ministerial level, the level of 
political directors, the senior official or expert level and the parliamentary level. Due to agenda 
difficulties there is a growing tendency to send lower deputies to dialogue meetings. Thus the 
ministers often send junior ministers, and political directors increasingly send deputy political directors 
or even more junior officials.130 
Another trend is a preference for dialogue with regional groupings, for instance with the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC). Despite the fact that these states all have their own ‘Europe 
Agreement’ with the European Community, political dialogues are often combined for reasons of 
efficiency. Since in the Europe Agreements political dialogues are meant to facilitate the associated 
country’s full integration into the Community, the group meetings are very much against the will of the 
individual CEEC, who generally does not like its cooperation with the Union to be dependent on 
relations with other states.131 In the case of the CEEC, political dialogues are institutionalized in the 
Association Council – the ministerial body to supervise the association agreements – which 
sometimes fuses with ordinary General Affairs Councils. Agenda problems are also the reason behind 
the fact that more and more meetings take place along the margins of other international gatherings, 
such as OSCE summits or the opening of the United Nations General Assembly. 
 
5.3 Use of Community Competences 
In practice, however, these CFSP competences have not changed the fact that the larger part of the 
EU’s democracy and human rights policies are based on Community legal bases. The most notable 
competences of the Union in this respect can be found in the use of economic and financial sanctions 
on the basis of articles 301 and 60 EC, and in the ‘essential element clause’ which forms part of 
treaties concluded between the Community and third states. 
While the political decision to impose a sanction on a third state is based on a CFSP provision, 
the economic or financial implications can be found in an EC Regulation. Although one may question 
the idea of enforcing good governance in third countries through punitive action, this instrument is 
often used. In particular sub-Saharan Africa has been substantially subjected to this type of 
instrument, often in response to coups.132 In many cases, however, the sanctions are combined with 
the use of conditionality clauses in treaties with the respective states. Since 1995 a uniform clause 
included in almost all treaties concluded between the EC and third states. This essential element 
clause reads: ‘Respect for the democratic principles and human rights […] inspires the domestic and 
                                                 
128 See on the political dialogue for instance J. Monar, ‘Political Dialogue with Third Countries and Regional 
Political Groupings: The Fifteen as an Attractive Interlocutor’, in E. Regelsberger et al. (eds.), Foreign Policy 
of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1997, p. 263-274. Many 
political dialogues were already established in the EPC period. 
129 Draft conclusions of the Council, adopted by the Political Committee on 7 June 1996, Doc. 8255/96. 
130 J. Monar, supra note 128, p. 271. 
131 Ibidem, p. 270 and in general on the relations and political dialogue with the CEEC: B. Lippert, ‘Relations 
with Central and Eastern European Countries: The Anchor Role of the European Union’, in E. Regelsberger 
et al. (eds.), Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond, Boulder, Lynne 
Rienner, 1997, p. 197-218. 
132 See R. Youngs, ‘European Union Democracy Promotion Policies: Ten Years On’, European Foreign Affairs 
Review, 2001, p. 355-373, at p. 356. 
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external policies of the Community and of [the third country concerned] and constitute an essential 
element of this agreement’.133 However, democratic conditionality has not been systematic and indeed 
is often a reaction to a negative development in a country, rather than a reason to establish a 
structural and more positive policy towards building democracy.134  
This is not to say that there has not been any positive democracy assistance. On the basis of a 
study by Young it can be concluded that European political aid even increased threefold during the 
1990s. Furthermore, funding has moved away from election monitoring towards support for NGOs. 
‘Good governance initiatives’ these days incorporate democracy-related components. The stated aim 
has been to pursue governance work in a way that facilitates broader democratic enhancement mostly 
without such efforts being labelled overtly as democracy-focused. Public administration reform 
programmes have sought to link the strengthening of policy-making capability to issues of access and 
accountability. Central to the EU’s approach has been a new holistic reasoning, linking together 
economic reform, social change, strategic diplomacy and democratization.135 
 
6. Conclusion 
The purpose of the present contribution has been to investigate whether and to what extent the 
European Union meets the challenge set by the Commission in its White Paper on European 
governance in the area of foreign, security and defence policy. Regarding the principle of participation, 
in the Union’s legal system a clear choice has been made in favour of democratic representation of the 
citizens of the Union through the European Parliament. However, the competences of the EP are 
extremely limited. One of the major shortcomings follows from the lack of possibilities for Parliament to 
hold the two main decision-making organs in CFSP – the Council and the European Council –
accountable. While the subsequent treaty modifications do reflect a somewhat increased interference 
by the EP regarding CFSP, possibilities in this respect remain limited to indirect interventions only, by 
making use of budgetary powers or through an influence on the Community dimensions of CFSP 
decisions. National parliaments only marginally compensate these shortcomings as the traditional 
prerogatives of the executive in most member states limit the parliamentary competences to an ex 
post facto scrutiny. Moreover, in the initiatives to stimulate the involvement of national parliaments in 
EU decision-making – exchange of information between national parliaments and the EP, improving 
access to timely information or cooperation between national European Affairs Committees – CFSP is 
a largely neglected area. 
The lack of democratic accountability can be said to form part of a more general ‘accountability 
deficit’ when judicial competences are taken into account. The European Court of Justice may only be 
called in when there is a threat to the acquis communautaire; internal CFSP arrangements and 
decisions are explicitly excluded from the competences of the Court. In addition, the direct applicability 
of CFSP decisions is far from commonly accepted, although it seems possible for a national court to 
accept the (in)direct effect of a CFSP provision whenever its national legal system allows it to do so. 
Finally, the theoretical competence which the International Court of Justice may have in certain cases 
lacks a practical value. 
European polls reveal that a European Union that is more active in the world meets the wishes of 
the EU citizen,136 but the ambitions of the Union in the area of security and defence have had a 
negative impact on public access to documents in that area and on the transparency of decision-
making. On a positive note, the Court made clear that no distinction is to be made between EC and 
other Union documents when access to documents is concerned. However, the new regime on access 
                                                 
133 See more extensively on the use and function of this clause: M. Bulterman, Human Rights in the Treaty 
Relations of the European Community: Real Virtues or Virtual Reality?, Antwerp, etc., Intersentia/Hart 
Publishing, 2001. 
134 R. Youngs, supra note 132. 
135 Ibidem. 
136 In the spring of 2003 the Eurobarometer showed 67% support for a common foreign policy and 77% for a 
common security and defence policy. Average figures are quite stable around 70%. 
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to documents that has been developed during the last few years and which finally resulted in a new 
Regulation in 2001 makes a clear exception for ‘sensitive documents’, thus allowing the Institutions 
(and even obliging the member states) to refuse access to a document where disclosure would 
undermine the protection of public interests as regards public security, defence and military measures. 
In itself this is a logical consequence of the establishment of a European Security and Defence Policy 
in which close cooperation with NATO (the source of the strict regime on sensitive documents) is 
thought to be essential. Ironically, the EU citizen pays a price for lifting the ambitions of the Union to a 
higher level. 
This brings us to the question of the competences of the Union to meet another objective listed in 
the Commission’s White Paper: to make a contribution to global governance. The Treaty indeed lists a 
number of instruments to be used by the Union to meet this objective. However, in most cases the 
instruments are not used to their full extent. They have a strong declaratory nature and their 
implementation relies on financial economic Community measures. Thus, instruments to contribute to 
‘global governance’ certainly form part of CFSP, but the overall picture remains one of a Union relying 
on its economic potential (‘wallet diplomacy’), in which the CFSP procedures function as a means to 
establish a political consensus to make financial donations out of the Community budget possible. 
So far, the implementation of the principles of good governance as phrased in the Commission’s 
White Paper in the area of foreign, security and defence policy seems to be hampered by the 
distinction that is still being made between the Community and the other areas of the Union. While it 
seems fair that member states should not be forced to allow more openness and scrutiny at the 
European level than they are used to at home with regard to these issues, the special arrangements 
regarding parliamentary and judicial scrutiny as well as the special status of sensitive CFSP and 
ESDP documents does not take the unity of the Union’s legal order into full account. In that respect 
the foreseen reorganization and simplification of the treaties – as proposed by the European 
Convention on the Future of Europe – can be helpful in linking the parliamentary and judicial 
procedures to specific issues, rather than to the increasingly artificial pillar structure.137 
 
                                                 
137  See for a survey of the changes foreseen by the draft Constitutional Treaty of 2003: M. Cremona, ‘The Draft 
Constitutional Treaty: External Relations and External Action’, Common Market Law Review, 2003, pp. 
1347-1366. 
